A lot of the bigger picture issues raised in this chapter, and a lot of political ecology in general, is very related to a phenomenology course I took last spring. This was one of the most interesting classes I have taken at Goucher, partially because of the name, but predominantly because of the subject matter. Phenomenology, and specifically Husserl, argues that you should not examine the conclusion which you have reached, but rather the suppositions and intentionality which allowed you to reach that conclusion.
A concrete example of this could be the examination of an abnormal behavior. A social scientist would most likely examine the behavior and come up with an explanation that involves the social circumstances and relationships of the individual. A biologist or geneticist, on the other hand, can examine the exact same behavior but explain it according to biological functions. This happens because each individual approaches the problem from their specific perspective; thus they find an answer according to how they approached the problem. Both conclusion can be equally legitimate, but what is important to recognize is that both conclusions were only able to happen because of how the researchers approached the question.
Similarly, as Robbins has illustrated in Political Ecology, our intentionality and what we brings towards nature effectively determines what kind of answers we receive. Especially with these concepts of degradation and marginalization, we see this phenomenological influence. How we view the land, its purposes, its uses, its natural state, etc. determine what we deem to be degradation. Depending on how we see this concept of degradation, we will have a different understanding of how to apply the degradation and marginalization thesis.
As this chapter showed, the thesis is not one thing which perfectly applies to a variety of different situations. Each unique problem will incorporate parts of the thesis, but there will almost always be different levels of both degradation and marginalization and even a changing relationship between the two. The phenomenological influence is present here as well, for in each case we must examine both the issue itself, and always what we are bringing to the table in our examination and how this influences our results.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Monday, November 9, 2009
Who decides what nature is?
Chapter 5 reflected upon a very significant problem, which is how to determine what is natural. As humans we have been interacting with the environment for thousands of years now; there is little to no land that has no been somehow impacted of affected by this human use. This isn’t even necessarily a bad thing. It only raises the question of when we preserve land, what are we preserving and why.
This relates directly to two separate conversations I’ve had with friends recently. The first was about a paper a friend was writing in which she was exploring essentially what being natural means. Her argument was essentially that even places like cities, which are not traditionally thought of as natural, actually are. For buildings, cement, cars, etc are all derived from materials which exist in the world or are given their existence by humans. Either way, humans are a part of nature, and thus anything we create must be a part of nature as well.
While this particular argument may be a bit of a stretch and not directly related, it still hinges upon that question of what makes something natural? As this chapter and this argument have illustrated, it is almost impossible to define the natural state of an area.
Another related argument I had with a friend this summer was about how to justify protecting the environment. This argument basically called upon this is/ought problem. Just because the world is a certain way, there is no reason to assume that is the way it ought to be. Thus the argument that humans ought to preserve nature and keep it how it is has much less credibility, for there is no valid reason for assuming that just because that is how nature was, that is how it ought to be. This is especially significant given the questions raised in chapter 5. What state of nature are we preserving? Nature has and continues to constantly change in unpredictable ways.
The fascinating questions political ecology raises are: who makes the decisions about what we are preserving? Who benefits from these decisions? Who loses? Why are these decisions made? Etc. The answers to all these questions in many cases will refer back to the discussion above, about what nature is or ought to be and why or how we ought to protect what parts of it.
This relates directly to two separate conversations I’ve had with friends recently. The first was about a paper a friend was writing in which she was exploring essentially what being natural means. Her argument was essentially that even places like cities, which are not traditionally thought of as natural, actually are. For buildings, cement, cars, etc are all derived from materials which exist in the world or are given their existence by humans. Either way, humans are a part of nature, and thus anything we create must be a part of nature as well.
While this particular argument may be a bit of a stretch and not directly related, it still hinges upon that question of what makes something natural? As this chapter and this argument have illustrated, it is almost impossible to define the natural state of an area.
Another related argument I had with a friend this summer was about how to justify protecting the environment. This argument basically called upon this is/ought problem. Just because the world is a certain way, there is no reason to assume that is the way it ought to be. Thus the argument that humans ought to preserve nature and keep it how it is has much less credibility, for there is no valid reason for assuming that just because that is how nature was, that is how it ought to be. This is especially significant given the questions raised in chapter 5. What state of nature are we preserving? Nature has and continues to constantly change in unpredictable ways.
The fascinating questions political ecology raises are: who makes the decisions about what we are preserving? Who benefits from these decisions? Who loses? Why are these decisions made? Etc. The answers to all these questions in many cases will refer back to the discussion above, about what nature is or ought to be and why or how we ought to protect what parts of it.
Monday, November 2, 2009
Having read and learned more about political ecology since my last posting, I still agree with my own conclusion that political ecology is awesome. I think the reason I find it so appealing is on the page 42, the 3rd full paragraph. After explaining the failure of a rather idiotic environmental project in Orissa, India, Robbins says, "But the larger questions still loom," and proceeds to rattle off a host of questions about why this program was started in the first place, who was responsible for it, who benefited and who suffered from it, etc. etc. It seems like so much more could be accomplished if more fields incorporated this holistic approach and, instead of trying to specialize and narrow our focus, we had a larger focus and could see all of the problems and/or issues that arise within a specific instance.
Given the historical nature of the chapter, there were not many contentious issues or points of disagreement that I had with Robbins. I actually found most of his arguments to be very well presented and explained, which had it rather nice to read. For example, his discussion of the common property theory was very logically put together. In explaining from an individuals point of view the consequences of the different actions in regards to common land, it makes sense (sadly) that people will try and let others do the work and reap the benefits, for that provides the most desirable consequences. Thus, as Robbins explains, this logic prevents common land from being available without any oversight or regulation, for it will most likely become abused in one way or another. I found this conceptually fascinating and somewhat depressing. However, it makes a lot of sense, especially in Robbins's presentation of the material.
Given the historical nature of the chapter, there were not many contentious issues or points of disagreement that I had with Robbins. I actually found most of his arguments to be very well presented and explained, which had it rather nice to read. For example, his discussion of the common property theory was very logically put together. In explaining from an individuals point of view the consequences of the different actions in regards to common land, it makes sense (sadly) that people will try and let others do the work and reap the benefits, for that provides the most desirable consequences. Thus, as Robbins explains, this logic prevents common land from being available without any oversight or regulation, for it will most likely become abused in one way or another. I found this conceptually fascinating and somewhat depressing. However, it makes a lot of sense, especially in Robbins's presentation of the material.
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